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Abstract 
The UK has been a high profile policy innovator in welfare-to-work provision that has led in the 
Coalition government's Work Programme to a fully outsourced, ‘black box’ model with payments 
based overwhelmingly on job outcome results. A perennial fear in such programmes is providers’ 
incentives to ‘cream’ and ‘park’ claimants and the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) have 
sought to mitigate such provider behaviours through Work Programme design, particularly via the use 
of claimant groups and differential pricing. In this paper we draw on a qualitative study of providers in 
the programme, alongside quantitative analysis of published performance data to explore evidence 
around creaming and parking. The combination of the quantitative and qualitative evidence suggests 
that creaming and parking are widespread and systematically embedded within the Work Programme 
and we argue that they are driven by a combination of intense cost-pressures and extremely ambitious 
performance targets, alongside overly diverse claimant groups and inadequately calibrated 
differentiated payment levels.  
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Introduction 
In common with much of the OECD (Lødemel and Trickey, 2001), since the arrival of New Labour in 
1997, the UK has made a decisive shift from a ‘passive’ to an ‘active’ welfare system in which eligibility 
for out of work benefits is tied increasingly tightly and explicitly to the stated obligation to seek paid 
work. This policy shift has been justified philosophically through the reciprocal relationship between 
rights and responsibilities embedded within the Third Way (Blair and Schroder, 1999; Giddens, 2000; 
Powell, 2000) and has resulted in considerable development of, and evolution in, ‘activating’ welfare-
to-work programmes through the 2000s. With the implementation of the Work Programme from 2011 
the UK has come closer to joining the ranks of other advanced economies in embracing outsourced 
provision, devolved decision-making around intervention design and payment by results.  
This evolution in recent decades in welfare-to-work services across the advanced economies is a 
result of several interrelated trends and concerns. There have been significant shifts in the 
organisation of services with the implementation of contracting-out and the creation of quasi-markets 
to respond to the critiques of public choice theorists around claims of unresponsive ‘bureaucratic’ state 
institutions and, more recently, the desire to transfer risk away from government (Considine, 2000; 
Bredgaard and Larsen, 2008; Mythen et al., 2012). These organisational reforms have been closely 
associated with the turns towards new managerialism and contractualism as well as shifts to ‘new’ 
governance modes involving changed relationships between the state, citizens and disadvantaged 
groups (Ramia and Carney, 2000; Considine, 2001; Struyven and Steurs, 2005). Finally, the influence 
of paternalism (Mead, 1986) on policy discourse, framing and making, has strengthened consistently 
in the UK since the late 1990s, such that, the Third Way balance between rights and responsibilities at 
the level of the individual has shifted to place greater onus on individual obligations. Moreover, at 
policy level there has been a parallel shift in emphasis away from the ‘carrots’ of policy supports (e.g. 
childcare, ‘making work pay’) toward the ‘sticks’ of sanctions-backed conditionality in response to 
alleged behavioural ‘defects’ (Department of Work and Pensions (DWP), 2010a). Taken together, the 
aim for policy makers has been to create more efficient and specialised provision that is also more 
flexible, responsive, and personalised to the different needs of unemployed individuals, against which 
the unemployed have limited options but to participate on the terms set out to them. 
As discussed in detail below, the evolution of welfare-to-work programmes in the UK through to the 
current Work Programme is, in a variety of ways, clearly influenced by these trends. Of particular 
interest to the present paper is the extent to which the specific design of the Work Programme is able 
to realise the key tenets underpinning international welfare-to-work reform over the past two decades 
– efficiency, effectiveness, personalisation, value-for-money, innovation, flexibility – within a 
programme design that appears to create multiple tensions and vulnerabilities around achieving these 
objectives. Of particular focus here is the challenge for the Work Programme to calibrate the 
incentives for providers to work differently in terms of meeting specific support needs – what Lister 
(2003) might term a process of ‘differentiated universalism’. In contrast to this aim, the international 
literature has consistently raised fears that in such outsourced, payment by results welfare-to-work 
schemes (particularly private) providers would respond to financial pressures and incentives by 
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‘creaming’ off easier to serve claimants whilst ‘parking’ harder to service clients (Struyven and Steurs; 
2005; Considine et al., 2011). These fears have been strongly aired in the UK context from the earliest 
days of the Work Programme (Public Accounts Committee (PAC), 2012) and have escalated both as 
the economic backdrop has become more challenging than anticipated during the design phase and 
as evidence has accumulated during the early months of the scheme expressing concerns of 
creaming and parking (Newton et al., 2012; Lane et al., 2013; PAC, 2012; PAC, 2013; Work and 
Pensions Select Committee (WSPC), 2011; WPSC, 2013; Rees et al., 2013). The argument from the 
Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) is that the specific design of the Work Programme – the 
existence of minimum service guarantees and, in particular, the use of nine claimant groups with 
differential payments across each – would effectively mitigate incentives for Prime providers to cream 
and park and the public statements of the DWP remain consistent in arguing that there is no evidence 
to suggest that this is not working (PAC, 2013). Within this context, the present paper draws on 
analysis of recently published official Work Programme data alongside qualitative research on 
providers’ experiences (Rees et al., 2013) in order to explore early evidence around creaming and 
parking in relation to the structures and incentives of the Work Programme’s design. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows; in the following section the evolution of welfare-to-
work policies in the UK since the late 1990s is outlined with an emphasis on drawing out the key 
principles and aims underpinning that evolution. This is followed by a summary of the international 
evidence on creaming and parking, its risks for the Work Programme in light of the scheme’s stated 
aim of delivering ‘differentiated universalism’ (Lister, 2003) in welfare-to-work support and the ways in 
which the detail of the scheme’s design seeks to mitigate those risks to achieve that aim. The 
quantitative and qualitative material is then used to analyse the evidence and experiences around 
creaming and parking whilst the final section discusses the findings and reflects on the implications for 
Work Programme design and for international learning. 
The path to the Work Programme: a radical departure from an established 
trend 
On coming to power in 1997 after almost two decades in opposition New Labour quickly embarked on 
a series of ‘activating’ New Deal welfare-to-work schemes. Various New Deals were created for 
different claimant groups with different levels of conditionality: New Deal for Young People (NDYP), for 
example, was a mandatory scheme that famously offered ‘no fifth option’ for those refusing to 
participate whilst those considered to have more ‘legitimate’ reasons for not working – most notably 
disabled adults and single parents – were offered voluntary schemes. In common across all of the 
New Deals however was a clear emphasis on supply-side measures and a ‘work first’ strategy of 
propelling working-age welfare recipients back into the labour market as swiftly as possible (Peck and 
Theodore, 2000). In shifting the policy focus clearly to the supply-side, demand-side issues around 
weak local labour markets and job availability were largely rejected as ‘old Left’ and not feasible in 
today’s global economy (Blair and Schroder, 1999). Unemployment was therefore recast largely as an 
individual problem of employability rather than a structural problem of insufficient employment 
availability in local areas, a shift which has been the focus of considerable critique (Theodore, 2007; 
  
 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
Wright, 2011) but which is seen particularly strongly and explicitly in the influential Freud Report 
(2007). Supplementing these New Deals were a raft of policies to ‘make work pay’, most notably the 
introduction of the national minimum wage, tax credits, and benefit run-ons. These incentivising 
policies were combined with greater attention than previously to the framework of policy supports 
needed, particularly improving the availability of affordable childcare through the UK’s first ever 
National Childcare Strategy and associated policies such as childcare subsidies for low-income 
workers, Sure Start, and free childcare places for three and four year olds. 
If the early New Labour years were marked by the rapid construction of this activating welfare-to-
work architecture then much of the following decade can perhaps best be described as one of 
‘creeping conditionality’ during which there was a consistent trend of ratcheting up work-related 
behavioural requirements as well as the extension of these work-related conditionality requirements to 
traditionally inactive groups, particularly single parents and the disabled (Dwyer, 2004). A critical 
juncture in the evolution of UK welfare-to-work policy was the publication of the Freud Report in 2007 
which received cross-party support and which was heralded as setting out the principles for welfare-to-
work policies in the forthcoming decade: outsourcing and competition; ‘black box’ delivery models in 
which the state allows providers complete freedom over intervention design; personalised support; 
and payment by results. Arguing that unemployment is now frictional rather than structural, Freud also 
argued that enhanced conditionality and sanctions were needed to tackle the alleged behavioural 
causes of worklessness and the existence of a ‘dependency culture’, despite compelling evidence to 
the contrary (DWP, 2010b; Shildrick et al., 2012). In the face of the empirical fragility of some of its key 
claims the Freud Report has nevertheless been highly influential to subsequent policy formulation. 
Almost immediately it set the template for New Labour’s subsequent reformulation in 2009 of the main 
New Deal programmes into one Flexible New Deal (FND) in which welfare-to-work support was 
outsourced from Jobcentre Plus (the public sector employment support agency covering the UK) to 
external providers after one year of Jobcentre Plus support (or six months for fast-tracked claimants). 
In FND financial payments to providers flowed mainly from successful job outcomes.  
The arrival of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government following the 2010 General 
Election heralded a change in policy from the FND to the Coalition’s Work Programme but also a 
continuation – indeed a radical extension and intensification – of the principles set out in Freud (2007) 
and on which FND was designed. Although reflecting continuation from FND in terms of underlying 
principles, the Work Programme, introduced in June 2011, is in various ways a genuine revolution in 
employment support policy, most notably in terms of the extent of sub-contracting and payments 
weighted to job outcomes as well as the ‘black box’ model of delivery. Delivery of the Work 
Programme takes place through contracts between DWP and large-scale, mainly private sector ‘Prime 
providers’ who can both deliver services themselves and/or sub-contract to organisations within large 
and (sometimes) complex supply chains sitting underneath each Prime. In very broad terms, sub-
contractors are either ‘tier 1’, delivering end-to-end services to participants throughout their time on the 
Work Programme, or ‘tier 2’ who contract with Primes or tier 1s to provide specific interventions to 
participants. The Work Programme is structured geographically in the sense that Great Britain is 
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divided into 18 large ‘regional
1
’ Contract Package Areas (CPAs) with two or three Primes in each CPA 
to whom claimants are randomly allocated from Jobcentre Plus if they have not found work within an 
initial period of Jobcentre Plus provision, the duration of which depends largely on the type of out-of-
work benefit received and the Work Programme claimant group in which they are therefore placed. 
Unlike FND, which contained mandatory service components, a ‘black box’ delivery model operates in 
the Work Programme so that providers have complete flexibility over their interventions, with only 
minimum service delivery guarantees (which are themselves of variable ambition, detail and potential 
enforceability) set out by each Prime provider (Finn, 2012). This flexibility is required given that, unlike 
the various group-specific New Deals, the Work Programme has to cater for the needs of all different 
types of largely long-term unemployed claimants within a single employment scheme, in part reflecting 
planned changes to the benefits system in the form of the consolidation of most of the major benefits 
and tax credits within the single Universal Credit from 2013.  
Creaming, parking and differential payments in the Work Programme 
‘Creaming’ and ‘parking’ by providers have long been considered endemic problems within welfare 
delivery systems involving outsourced provision combined with outcomes-based payments (Finn, 
2011) and international experience of similar welfare-to-work models highlights the extent of these 
issues in practice (Heckman, et al. 2002; Dockery and Stromback, 2001; van Berkel and van de Aa, 
2005;  Finn, 2011). ‘Creaming’ refers to providers skimming off clients who are closest to the labour 
market and targeting services on them in the expectation that they are more likely to trigger an 
outcome payment. ‘Parking’ refers to the opposite process, where those individuals deemed to be 
unlikely to generate an outcome payment are de-prioritised, perhaps receiving the minimum service 
specified in the contract. The issue is closely related to the more general economic literature around 
the difficulties in effectively managing principal-agent relationships via contracts (Bredgaard and 
Larsen, 2008) and is made more likely where regulatory control or organisational norms or incentives 
against it are low – most obviously where providers are private organisations attracted to participation 
in welfare provision due to a simple profit motive. Of the 40 contracts won within the Work Programme 
35 were won by private sector Primes, three by third sector organisations and two by public sector 
organisations and fears of ‘creaming’ and ‘parking’ were strong from the outset. These concerns 
intensified in the context of tighter than expected cost-pressures on Primes due to a combination of a 
more difficult than expected economic environment which affected job outcome (and hence payment) 
levels, the prevalence – and apparent success of  – discounting practices at the bidding stage, and 
lower than expected caseloads within some payment groups (Inclusion, 2011a). 
In addition to highlighting the ubiquity of creaming and parking, the literature makes clear that the 
detail of programme design and payment structures can play a role in either mitigating or facilitating 
such provider behaviours (Considine, 2000; Struyven and Steurs, 2005; van Berkel and van de Aa, 
2005; Considine et al., 2011; Finn, 2011; Finn, 2012). In bringing together such a diverse range of 
claimants into one single programme DWP were aware from the outset that this was a challenge for 
                                            
1 the North East, North West, Scotland and Wales are all examples of the scale of CPAs  
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the Work Programme and sought to mitigate these risks through the programme’s design. This was 
attempted partly through the requirement for Primes to set out minimum service guarantees but 
primarily through the placement of each individual into one of nine Work Programme claimant groups 
based on the type of benefit received as a proxy for the level of their perceived support needs. These 
claimant groups are important to providers because they carry with them different entry requirements 
and, crucially, different levels of financial reward for job outcome payments scaled according to some 
notion of the average difficulty of transitions to employment for each claimant group (National Audit 
Office (NAO), 2012; Lane et al., 2013). To adopt Lister’s terminology, the issue is one of ‘differentiated 
universalism’ (Lister, 2003) – seeking equality whilst (indeed, through) recognising difference – 
whereby policy makers seek to use the differentiated payments across claimant groups to incentivise 
Work Programme providers to treat different claimants differently dependent upon their distance to the 
labour market and barriers to work in order that all claimants receive the amount and type of support 
so as to equalise opportunities to move into employment. Payments across these claimant groups 
vary from a maximum of £3,810 for Jobseekers’ Allowance claimants (JSA) aged 18 to 25 to £13,720 
potentially for an individual within the Employment Support Allowance (ESA) group for recent 
Incapacity Benefit (IB) claimants. As Robert Devereux, Permanent Secretary of the DWP, explained to 
the Committee of Public Accounts in February 2011, this is a step on from previous programme design 
in the UK in the field of welfare-to-work: 
This set of prices, as has just been said, begins to move us towards trying to reflect some 
of the average difficulty…Everything we have done here takes us really a long way 
forward compared with where we were (PAC, 2012).  
DWP’s hope is that, if designed appropriately, differentiated payments across claimant groups would 
translate the policy rhetoric of differentiated universalism into policy reality, mitigating providers’ 
incentives to cream and park. Compared to FND, however, and to most comparable international 
welfare-to-work schemes operating an outsourced payment-by-results financing model, the Work 
Programme weights a smaller share of the provider’s potential payment to the initial attachment – or 
joining – fee and a far larger share to employment transitions and, in particular, sustained job 
outcomes (generally measured in the Work Programme as six months of sustained employment). 
Within FND the ratio between the initial joining fee, a successful transition into work and a sustained 
job outcome was roughly 40:30:30 (Vegeris et al., 2011:13) whilst in the Work Programme the ratio is 
closer to 10:25:65
2
, although it varies somewhat across the nine claimant groups. With performance 
outcomes therefore mattering to a far greater degree in the Work Programme than in comparable 
previous schemes it becomes critical to successfully mitigate the economically rational incentives to 
cream and park amongst Primes both that the level of financial payments between payment groups 
realistically reflects the relative difficulty of moving claimants within these groups into (sustained) 
employment and that these claimant groups are relatively homogeneous internally such that a single 
level of payment realistically reflects the needs of all claimants within each claimant group. If either of 
these assumptions is not satisfied then there should be a logical expectation that creaming and 
                                            
2 Authors’ calculations based on Inclusion (2011b) 
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parking will take place if providers are assumed to be economically rational and if they are confident 
that creaming and parking will go undetected and/or unpunished. In the following section the 
overarching question that the discussion of the quantitative and qualitative material seeks to answer is 
a simple one: does it appear that the DWP have succeeded in designing a scheme that mitigates 
against providers’ incentives to cream and park? 
Data and methods 
In order to answer these questions we bring to bear a mixed quantitative and qualitative approach. 
The quantitative analysis draws on the Work Programme’s official statistics published online by the 
Department for Work and Pensions. These statistics show the numbers of unemployed people 
referred and attached to the Work Programme and numbers of job outcome payments made to 
providers as a result of participants achieving sustained employment (six months of employment or 
three months for members of ‘harder-to-help’ payment groups) (DWP, 2013). We construct DWP’s 
preferred ‘job outcome rate’ measure (job outcomes/referrals) from the most recent official programme 
statistics and this covers the period from programme launch in 2011 to the end of March 2013. 
Qualitative analysis draws on a research project that involved key informant interviews and case 
studies of Work Programme delivery in two localities (Rees et al., 2013). The eight key informant 
interviews included respondents from third sector and employment services infrastructure 
organisations, private and third sector Prime contractor organisations, and some large national third 
sector organisations delivering the Work Programme as sub-contractors. The case studies of delivery 
were located in two areas chosen to provide geographical and labour market diversity (inner-city 
versus semi-rural, north versus south England) and different supply chain models. In each area a brief 
‘mapping’ exercise identified the role and type of organisations in the supply chains. This was followed 
by a phone survey of these sub-contractors (approximately 65% contacted) which confirmed a number 
of their basic characteristics, their position and role in the supply chain and the nature of their 
provision. These issues were further explored in two focus groups with sub-contractors (one each for 
‘tier 1’ and ‘tier 2’ providers) held in one of the localities. Finally interviews were conducted with four of 
the 5 private sector primes operating in the two sampled areas (the fifth declined to take part) and 14 
of their sub-contracted providers.  
Differential payments but still differential outcomes: rhetoric versus reality in 
the Work Programme 
As a first step in understanding claimants’ differing needs, profiling tools have become increasingly 
commonplace within welfare-to-work programmes both in the UK and internationally. Within the Work 
Programme, Prime providers are adopting a whole range of approaches to profiling and using these 
analyses to guide (at least in the first instance) the intensity and type of interventions targeted at the 
individual (Newton et al., 2012: 47-49). Tellingly, however, rather than adopting DWP’s claimant 
groups as the structure for their activities Prime providers tend to develop their own streams of 
claimants and related intervention packages, suggesting that the differentiated payments embedded 
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within the Work Programme’s claimant groups may well not correspond to providers’ view of 
claimants’ distance to labour market. Rather, commenting on the providers’ use of these profiling tools 
one provider suggested that the RAG rating system
3
 used by some Primes and their end-to-end 
providers to ‘triage’ their caseloads was in effect a mechanism for creaming those rated ‘green’, 
focusing energies and resources on those easiest and most likely to move into work, whilst parking 
claimants rated ‘red’ who are considered to need more time and resource to support back into work. 
Asked if this was the case, one sub-contracted provider stated: 
That’s done openly. [At the first customer assessment] you’d give an anticipated job start 
date and you categorise people on day one into red, amber and green categories… So 
from day one you’re categorised and if you’re a green customer you’ve got an anticipated 
job start date, you’ve got an action plan to work towards that, and you have to be seen so 
that is once or twice a week.  So you’re pushed.  If you’re amber your job start date is 
obviously further away, and it’s the expectation that you’ll have activity at least once a 
fortnight.  If you’re red it could be a phone call once a month.  So people are not using the 
word parking because it’s politically incorrect, but it’s happening. [tier 2 provider]  
Indeed, Work Programme providers with long-standing experience of welfare-to-work provision argued 
that such practices were not just endemic but that they could also be seen as a rational response to 
the current payment by results model and its misalignment with the actual support needs of individual 
claimants across and within the claimant groups. Nevertheless, while interviewees expressed the view 
that most providers would cream if given the chance, there were a number of ways in which potential 
mechanisms for creaming could be shut off. One was strict random allocation of jobseekers between a 
Prime’s ‘in-house’ delivery and delivery by their ‘end-to-end’ delivery partners. One Prime claimed this 
was preferable in any case because it permitted proper comparison of performance between providers 
in the supply chain and therefore improved performance management, but it was impossible to verify 
whether this system could in reality be circumvented. The incentive for Primes to cream skim could be 
removed entirely where they outsourced all delivery to their sub-contractors, as is the case with a 
number of Primes in the Work Programme; but certainly this may in effect push the issue down to the 
sub-contractor level. Whilst feeling that creaming and parking were hard to avoid in the current design 
given the intense dual pressures around costs and targets not all providers were comfortable with 
these practices. The following provider, for example, was uncomfortable behaving in this way towards 
claimants but felt torn by the need to deliver the targets for the organisation within the budget 
available:  
So we are going to have these numbers of customers that perhaps may never find 
employment in the two years. We’ll never be paid for them either but we’ll be paid for the 
other 50% that are likely to go on into work so there’s a level of parking going on which 
we’re not particularly comfortable with but we also need to achieve what we need to 
achieve and what the Primes need to achieve so it’s trying to get a balance really. [tier 1 
provider] 
 
                                            
3 RAG rating uses a traffic light system to group individuals either as red (hard to move into work), 
amber (moderately difficult to move into work) or green (easy to move into work). 
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However, another provider argued that parking was a sensible way to manage the caseload and the 
extent of parking would need to be assessed over the full length of the attachment period: 
I think from a provider perspective we are expected to prioritise customers that are 
coming through who are job ready and to move those through as quickly as we can, 
and I think from a financial perspective that’s realistic because you’ve got to get the 
money in the system to keep it all flowing. I don’t think you purposefully park people 
but it could seem like that from the outside because it’s taking longer to get those 
people job ready or… they’re being referred onto, say, drug and alcohol services who 
will be working with them and until they have their condition managed then you can’t 
work with them.  So there might be a perception of parking because it’s taking longer 
and efforts are, at this group, to move them through [the system]. [tier 2 provider] 
 
To try to get a sense of the nature and scale of the issue, Figure 1 summarises the most recent official 
Work Programme job outcomes’ data published by DWP in June 2013 which covers the first 21 
months of programme operation. This is admittedly early data in the lifetime of the scheme, but it does 
suggest problems in the extent to which the current differentiated payments’ design is effectively 
calibrating provider incentives between payment groups. At its simplest level the differential payments 
across the claimant groups should at least be calibrated so as to equalise providers’ incentives to work 
with (of course only notional) ‘average claimants’ between the separate claimant groups, as 
Devereux’s evidence to the Public Accounts Committee cited above focuses on. If the differentiated 
payment system is effectively calibrating providers’ incentives between the Work Programme’s 
claimant groups in terms of some idea of the ‘average claimant’ within each of these groups then one 
would, on average, expect the job outcome rates to be relatively evenly balanced between the various 
claimant groups. Figure 1, however, shows in contrast that there are considerable imbalances in job 
outcomes between the claimant groups, suggesting underlying imbalances in the extent to which the 
current payment levels are equalising the balance between costs, risks and returns across these 
claimant groups. Whilst the overall job outcomes rate comes out at just under 11% (the horizontal line) 
two groups are doing markedly better than this average whilst a number of payment groups are doing 
markedly less well. 
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Figure 1: Differential job outcomes between Work Programme claimant groups 
 
 
Part of the hesitance of providers in adopting DWP’s claimant groups as their own framework for 
targeting claimants, reflects their recognition that the groups are relatively crude and with significant 
internal heterogeneity. This is well known both by policy makers and within the academic literature yet 
the persistence of the differentiated payments model attached to such broad and internally diverse 
claimant groups has significant implications for claimants in terms of their increased exposure to 
systemic risks of creaming and parking. As a consequence, and in contrast to Robert Devereux’s 
response to the Committee of Public Accounts cited above, the appropriate question in terms of 
seeking to design-out creaming and parking is not whether the current programme design is more 
subtle than previous welfare-to-work schemes but, rather, whether it is adequate to overcome 
creaming and parking. Although it remains early days for the Work Programme the evidence 
accumulating here and elsewhere (Newton et al., 2012; Lane et al., 2013; PAC, 2012; PAC, 2013; 
WPSC, 2011; WPSC, 2013; Rees et al., 2013) suggests not. The first phase of the DWP-
commissioned qualitative evaluation of the Work Programme for example is surprisingly frank for an 
official evaluation: “the available evidence to date suggests that providers are engaging in creaming 
and parking, despite the differential payments regime” (Newton et al., 2012: 124). 
Cost pressures, combined with ambitious targets, were seen by many providers as a basic but 
central issue and there was a widespread perception that whatever process and design improvements 
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might be made the underlying reason for creaming and parking was under-resourcing of the 
programme. As one experienced operator in the welfare-to-work field commented: 
Regardless of what the government are saying… they haven’t funded it properly to be 
able to get a good service. They wanted to move to an all-encompassing service and 
they had an ideal opportunity to do that, and I for one thought it was brilliant that they did 
that… and they had a really good opportunity to make sure that that was funded properly 
so that we really could see improvement in people going back into work and it’s just not 
happening, is it?  Or it’s not happening on the scale that they wanted it to [tier 2 provider] 
Within this pressurised context Primes were acutely aware that claimant groups were a blunt 
instrument oriented primarily around the prior benefit received and not necessarily coterminous with a 
customer’s distance from the labour market. This could work in either direction, with some individuals 
placed in relatively ‘job ready’ groups attracting relatively low potential payments (e.g. JSA 18-24 or 
JSA 25+) actually felt by providers to face serious barriers to moving into paid work whilst, conversely, 
some individuals placed in relatively ‘hard to place’ claimant groups attracting substantial financial 
payments for sustained job outcomes (e.g. ESA ex-IB4 claimants) may actually be assessed by 
Primes as needing relatively little support to move into paid work – the ideal client from a Prime 
provider’s perspective. This inevitably left providers reflecting on these frequent mismatches between 
their own evaluation of the individual’s distance to labour market and the Work Programme’s 
evaluation as proxied by the level of financial payment attached to that individual’s claimant group. For 
example one third sector organisation noted the extent of undiagnosed mental health issues amongst 
JSA claimants: 
There have been a lot of undiagnosed mental health conditions, as secondary [pause] as 
secondary illnesses to what’s actually going on… some of these people have got 
extremely complex barriers before they even think about going into work… And yet 
they’re a JSA customer and they [pause] the number of times that I want to say, ‘This 
person should not be on the Work Programme, they’re probably a work [pause] if 
anything, they’re a Work Choice5 customer… or they need to be left alone for at least six 
months and helped to sort out the other issues that they have’. [tier 2 provider] 
One interesting finding is that whilst the creaming and parking debate, both here and elsewhere, 
tends to be framed in the language of incentive structures and rational economic behaviour there is 
evidence that some parking might arise inadvertently because of the inexperience or inadequate 
information held by providers and that there might be a learning curve to go through similar to that 
seen in the Australian Job Network (Dockery and Stromback, 2001). One end-to-end provider, for 
example, described how job advisers within a particular Prime might lack the knowledge (and are 
bowed by pressure from high caseloads) to refer jobseekers to appropriate sub-contractors, by 
implication, leaving them to be parked. Additionally, the initial assessment is supposed to ‘flag’ 
customer needs but this was not, apparently, working effectively. They therefore decided to send their 
own staff to work alongside job advisers to ‘drive’ referrals to the sub-contractor: 
                                            
4 Incapacity Benefit (IB) is currently being replaced by the Employment and Support Allowance (ESA). 
5 Work Choice is a separate employment programme offering support to individuals with disabilities 
and long term health conditions. 
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Our workers are backing [named Prime] officers making sure that people remember to 
refer people to [named tier 1 provider], that actually if you’ve got somebody who’s got a 
substance misuse or mental health issue you’re better off referring them to [same tier 1 
provider] than holding onto them and not being able to get them a job. [tier 1 provider] 
Another provider commented similarly that whilst assessment tools may be widely used they are also 
far from comprehensively developed or utilised such that front-line advisers were sometimes ill-
prepared to refer effectively: 
And actually, will those frontline advisers know what to do with that customer?  Doubt it.  
Probably park them.  But what I thought was, right, let me come up with something that 
takes the best of what Australia have got in terms of assessment, using health 
professionals, occupational therapists, develop that in the UK to make an assessment 
that’s face-to-face, that actually gives direction for that customer so what happens is now 
[is progression to specific services]. [tier 2 provider] 
Whilst potentially emerging from informational or skills deficits in addition to economic motivations, 
therefore, the quantitative material presented in Figure 2 is also consistent with, and lends support to, 
the idea that the current Work Programme design does not adequately mitigate incentives to cream 
and park across different types of claimants within claimant groups in addition to simply between those 
groups. To explore this issue Figure 2 focuses on differences in job outcome rates between claimants 
with and without employment ‘disadvantages’ relating to disability and single parenthood across the 
three largest payment groups which together make up around 80% of referrals to date. The rationale 
for these analyses is that single parents and the disabled might be expected to be ‘harder to place’ for 
providers and, as such, might rationally be expected to be more vulnerable to parking.  
The trend in Figure 2 for lower outcome rates amongst the relatively ‘disadvantaged’ payment 
group members is seen clearly and consistently across the three payment groups when comparing 
participants with a reported disability against those with no disability. Drawing on the social model of 
disability, where societal barriers operate to prevent disabled people from participating as equals in 
society (Barnes and Mercer, 2003) there are additional barriers faced by disabled people seeking work 
(Patrick, 2012) and the additional costs associated with overcoming these barriers may be at play in 
lower outcome rates for this group. Clearly these data do not prove that creaming and parking are 
taking place but they are in line with that practice and at a minimum highlight that the current 
differential payments structure is not calibrated to individual variation.  
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Figure 2: Differential job outcomes within Work Programme claimant groups 
 
 
The chronic scarcity of care compatible employment opportunities (Gingerbread, 2010) and lack of 
affordable local childcare (Daycare Trust, 2012) stimulate an expectation that lone parents may face 
particular difficulties in securing sustained work from the Work Programme. Figure 2 however shows 
that the story from the Work Programme so far is a little more complex in that whilst younger lone 
parents fare consistently less well than younger non-lone parents in terms of their job outcome rates, 
older lone parents fare consistently better than older non-lone parents. It is unclear why these findings 
should be seen although it might be partly due to the fact that younger lone parents have younger 
children (Coleman and Lanceley, 2011) and that, for the reasons outlined above, younger children 
present stronger obstacles to lone parent employment (Bryson et al., 1997). Older lone parents also 
tend to have stronger human capital and work histories than younger lone parents (Coleman and 
Lanceley, 2011).  
The JSA Early Access group comprises three separate types of claimants: mandatory entry of 18-
year-olds not in education, employment or training (NEETs); mandatory entry of JSA ‘repeaters’ (those 
receiving JSA for 22 of the past 24 months); and voluntary early entry for pre-identified ‘vulnerable’ 
JSA claimants (DWP, 2013). Whilst it is impossible to say from the publicly available data; lone 
parents seem most likely to have been recruited to this group as JSA repeaters and thus to have 
some recent labour market experience. When compared with lone parents in the JSA18-24 payment 
group, lone parents in the JSA Early Access group are also likely to be generally older and to have 
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older children. Moreover, whilst job outcomes are triggered only after six months of sustained work for 
the JSA payment groups this occurs after three months for the JSA Early Entry group which will 
certainly help to make the job outcome rates in this group seem relatively more impressive than the 
other two JSA groups.  
To explore these issues further our analyses take advantage of the fact that the Work Programme 
is broken down into 40 separate contracts with Primes across the 18 CPAs, with some Primes 
delivering across several CPAs and so having several contracts. Figure 3 extends the quantitative 
analyses by focusing on the question of consistency in results, again making use of the ability within 
the official data to disaggregate job outcomes by disability and single parenthood. For each Work 
Programme contract Figure 3 shows the difference between the disabled and non-disabled job 
outcome rates (horizontal axis) and the difference between the single parent and non-single parent job 
outcome rates (vertical axis). For both axes a difference of zero implies identical job outcome rates 
between the two groups, positive values mean that the non-disabled/non-single parent job outcome 
rate is higher than the disabled/single parent job outcome rate and negative values mean the 
opposite. Figure 3 is presented as a quadrant and if the Work Programme’s model of claimant groups 
and differential payments was successfully calibrating providers’ incentives across claimants then one 
would expect any resulting differences in rate differences to be due to chance rather than anything 
systematic. In this case the points would tend to centre around zero at the intersection of the two lines 
shown and to show a fairly random cloud of points around that intersection.  
In contrast to this neutral picture, Figure 3 highlights across the horizontal axis that disabled 
participants experience markedly lower job outcomes than non-disabled participants in every Work 
Programme contract. Looking along the vertical axis, there is also a consistent pattern in most (though 
not all) contracts that younger lone parents fare markedly less well than younger non-lone parents. In 
contrast, however, it is interesting to see that older lone parents tend to see somewhat better job 
outcome rates, the result perhaps of the combination of weaker needs for care-compatible work and 
childcare along with evidence showing that lone parents have a particularly strong motivation to work 
(Tu and Ginnis, 2012). If differential job outcome rates between ‘easier to help’ and ‘harder to help’ 
claimants are accepted to be an indicator of potential parking then the consistency in these findings 
across the 40 contracts lends weight to the notion that strategies, practices and cultures of Prime 
providers in relation to creaming and parking may well be involved. 
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Figure 3: Patterned inequalities in job outcomes across Work Programme contracts 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
The Work Programme represents a radical extension of the incremental evolution of employment 
services witnessed in recent years in the UK. It implements for the first time, at a national level, a fully 
outsourced ‘black box’ model with payments based almost entirely on job outcome results. The 
programme aims to realise the key tenets underpinning international welfare-to-work reform over the 
past two decades but appears to be vulnerable to multiple tensions inherent within its design. This 
paper has focused on the challenge for the all-encompassing Work Programme to calibrate the 
incentives for providers to work differently but equally in meeting the specific support needs of all 
jobseekers. The DWP sought to mitigate the identified risks around creaming and parking primarily 
through the placement of each individual into one of nine claimant groups each with different levels of 
financial payments for job outcomes scaled according to a notion of the average difficulty of securing 
transitions to employment in each. DWP’s hope is that, if designed appropriately, differentiated 
payments across claimant groups would turn the rhetoric of ‘differentiated universalism’ into policy 
reality, mitigating providers’ incentives to cream and park. 
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The combination of the quantitative and qualitative data presented above, however, suggest that 
this has not been achieved in practice and that creaming and parking may also be systemic in that 
they flow directly from the current design of the Work Programme. If the differentiated payment system 
was effectively calibrating providers’ incentives between the Work Programme’s claimant groups then 
one would, on average, expect the job outcomes rates to be relatively evenly balanced between the 
various claimant groups. This is not the case in practice, suggesting underlying imbalances in the 
extent to which the current payment levels are equalizing the balance between costs, risks and returns 
across these claimant groups. Disaggregating the data for ‘harder to place’ groups across the 40 Work 
Programme contracts display an alarming degree of consistency in the findings that disabled people 
and young lone parents experience relatively lower job outcome rates than their ‘non-disadvantaged’ 
peers. Far from delivering ‘differentiated universalism’ the Work Programme at present may instead to 
be reinforcing, exacerbating and making systemic the negative impacts of employment disadvantages. 
Unfortunately, to fully answer this question we would need to compare the results of the analysis 
presented here to similar ones for previous programmes such as the Flexible New Deal 
(acknowledging that earlier programmes were different in a number of key respects, and such a 
comparison may be difficult) to explore whether the Work Programme is relatively worse in these 
respects. 
In response to the key question posed at the outset of the paper, it is extremely difficult to argue on 
the basis of this evidence that DWP have succeeded in designing the Work Programme payment 
groups and differential payments such that they mitigate providers’ incentives to cream and park 
different individuals either across or within its broad payment groups, all in a context where providers 
are experiencing intense pressures around costs, cash flows and performance. Clearly these 
quantitative data alone do not prove that parking is taking place – one needs to align the evidence on 
outcomes with the qualitative evidence around Work Programme processes for that – but the patterns 
seen are perfectly in line with what would be expected if parking were occurring. When taken together 
with the various emerging qualitative evidence discussed here, from the official Work Programme 
evaluation (Newton et al., 2012; Lane et al., 2013) and from government select committees (PAC, 
2012; PAC, 2013; WPSC, 2011; WPSC, 2013) then the notion that creaming and parking are serious 
problems within the Work Programme becomes compelling.  
It will be of particular interest to an international audience that this evidence has been found 
despite the progression to what, at least superficially, appears a more complex and nuanced 
framework from DWP in terms of payment groups and differential payments. Whilst value for money 
arguments from policy makers support a heavy weighting of payments onto job outcomes this raises 
the inevitable challenge to mitigate providers’ incentives to focus their energies and resources where it 
will pay. Value for money arguments such as these carry risks around parking, not just for claimants 
but also for on-going social security budgets for those who fail to be supported into work. At present it 
seems the Work Programme design may not have struck the right balance between value for money, 
incentives and claimant protections. With a challenging economic backdrop constraining job outcomes 
and with providers – and government select committees (WPSC, 2013) – united in questioning the 
adequacy of resources within the programme to meet the support needs of more challenging 
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claimants such risks and weaknesses in programme deign are magnified. The challenge for UK and 
international policy makers seeking to embrace quasi-marketised welfare-to-work delivery is to drive 
forward the evolution of their programmes such that they better balance their inevitable tensions 
between efficiency and equity.  
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